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Abstract: What do we mean when we describe the history 
of the Caribbean as traumatic? Is it possible to use the term 
‘trauma’ here in a more technical sense, or should we give 
it the less strict connotation of an extreme form of an event 
in which the past no longer stays just in the past and the 
future never ceases to demand something from the pres-
ent? In this paper I analyze the image of the abyss, used by 
Édouard Glissant to evoke poetically one of the beginnings 
of the Caribbean, as leading to a paradox on the attitude 
toward history: Caribbean communities have been bur-
dened with a non-history that feels, at the same time, like 
too much history. I show that this image resembles the 
paradoxical structure of trauma developed in the works of 
Cathy Caruth, according to whom trauma is a paradoxical 
structure of experience in which the subject (or a com-
munity) is painfully possessed by an image that they have 
barely perceived and that is so minimal that it cannot be 
controlled. However, I argue, there are limits to this re-
semblance. I focus on the question whether the (traumatic) 
paradox is escapable in this region of the world, that is, 
whether Caribbean communities can be de-traumatized, 
and what are the connections of this possibility with the 
question, central to Glissant, of decolonization. In order to 
answer these questions, I analyze a central feature of the 
Caribbean history according to Glissant, transversality, to 
show in what way the paradox of history can be loosened.  
 
Keywords: Édouard Glissant, Cathy Caruth, abyss, 
trauma, history, transversality, decolonial. 
  
 
“Would it be ridiculous to consider our lived history as a steadily advan-
cing neurosis?” 




Because of its particular geography, the Caribbean became 
the first, and one of the most important points of contact 
between Europe and America, turning it into the testing 
location of many of the colonial strategies and economic 
exploitative systems that were later used by European 
powers to colonize the rest of the continent and even other 
parts of the world. In such a context, the history of this re-
gion is usually described as the continuous unfolding of 
traumatic experiences for the communities of enslaved, 
colonized, and assimilated human beings that constitute it, 
a history that continues until today. This particular lan-
guage, the language of trauma, is especially common when 
addressing Édouard Glissant’s approaches to the birth of 
the Caribbean. In his work, Glissant examines the many 
political and economic devices employed by the colonizers 
to found and maintain the submission of dozens of mil-
lions throughout more than four centuries. This is read in 
some secondary bibliography through the framework and 
lenses of trauma. To mention just one prominent example, 
in the recent collection of essays Theorizing Glissant 
(edited by John E. Drabinski and Marisa Parham), six of 
the eight academic contributions (including the introduc-
tion) associate the words ‘trauma’ or ‘traumatic’ with the 
experience of the Middle Passage and the relocation of Af-
rican slaves in the new territories, with the space and land-
scapes of the Caribbean as well as its economic and politi-
cal forms of production (i.e. the plantation, the hacienda, 
the encomienda, etc.), and with the possibility of memory 
and remembrance under such conditions. This is of course 
not a coincidence, or a whim; Glissant himself designates 
as traumatic some of the effects of racism and colonization 
in the region, and, as the epigraph above makes clear, he 
even considers its possibility from a more technical per-
spective.1  
But what do we mean when we describe the history of 
the Caribbean as traumatic? Is it really possible to use the 
term ‘trauma’ here in a more technical sense, as it is used 
today in psychology and psychoanalysis? Or should we 
give it the less strict connotation of an extreme form of an 
event in which the past no longer stays just in the past and 
the future never ceases to demand something from the 
present2? In what follows, I would like to examine what is 
perhaps a combination of these two approaches: an under-
standing of trauma as arising from the works of Cathy Ca-
ruth, primarily based on her reading of Sigmund Freud. 
According to Caruth, trauma is a paradoxical structure of 
experience in which the event is marked by the encounter 
between an excess and an absence of meaning. Namely, an 
experience in which the subject (or a community) is pain-
fully possessed by an image that they have barely per-
ceived and that is so minimal that it cannot be controlled. I 
believe Glissant’s description of the abyss as one of the 
images connected to the beginning of the Caribbean re-
sembles this paradoxical structure. In what follows, I want 
to ask whether, in this sense, it would be possible to say 
that the history of this region of the world is indeed a 
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traumatic history3. As I will suggest in the final section of 
this text, I am particularly interested in examining whether 
this (traumatic) paradox is escapable, that is, whether 
Caribbean communities can be de-traumatized, and what 
are the connections of this possibility with the question, 
central to Glissant, of decolonization. Is the abyss some-
thing that the descendants of millions of enslaved Africans 
can overcome, forget, leave behind? In what way? Up until 
when is it possible to preserve the image of trauma as a 





I would like to begin with a comparison between two po-
etic images to show in what sense and to what extent Glis-
sant’s notion of the abyssal beginning5 of the Caribbean 
could serve to describe a “traumatic” condition. The first 
of these images is given by the mythic figure of Benkos 
Biohó, one of the earliest, and the most remembered leader 
of the resistance of the African slaves in the city of Carta-
gena, at the beginning of the 16th century. I would like to 
focus on one of the written imaginations of Biohó’s death, 
included in the novel La ceiba de la memoria (2016), by 
Roberto Burgos Cantor.6  After a betrayal on the part of the 
authorities of the city, who had agreed with Biohó’s forces 
in the palenques to cease fire and let the maroons govern 
themselves, Biohó is hanged in the main square of the city 
and his body is dismembered and paraded. In the last mo-
ments of his life, staring at the Atlantic sea, and turning his 
back to the land of his childhood, Biohó reflects on the 
connection between Cartagena and Africa: 
 
Frente al mar va a ser ahorcado Benkos Biohó rey de la Matuna. 
Aprieto los ojos y no veo mi tierra. Mar y mar. Mis dioses no 
acuden. La aldea de mis padres los hermanos se han vuelto 
invisibles. Digo padre: nada acude. Digo madre: nada viene. 
Casa: no aparece. Enamorada digo: y una piedra una piel de sapo 
muerto en la playa un vacío que absorbe y oprime se anuncia en 
mi pecho y no cabe. (Burgos Cantor 2016, 376f)7 
 
Biohó’s attitude is consistent with his resignation, 
throughout the novel, to the inescapability of the black 
slaves’ present. The way back to their homeland is lost 
forever; the enormous sea that the majority of slaves fear 
because of what it meant for them on their transportation 
to Cartagena, cannot be walked back. In his last moments 
before his death, seeing all the work of his life as a futile 
attempt to resist and restore what cannot be restored, 
Biohó senses that his land is so far away that his gods no 
longer can respond to his calls; they either cannot hear him 
or they do not know how to navigate across the sea to 
come to meet him. What remains is a desperate, nostalgic 
gaze at his well-remembered land, and the sea is the con-
stant reminder of the insurmountable distance to this past. 
To come back in time in the form of traveling back in 
space would solve the desperate present and offer redemp-
tion. These, however, will never be an option for the 
slaves. Their African past is irrecoverable because they 
will never travel back to their homeland.8 
Now, let’s compare this attitude toward the past with 
another fiction. In “Utopia of a tired man,” a piece in-
cluded in his 1975 collection of short stories The Book of 
Sand, Jorge Luis Borges describes the wanderings of its 
protagonist, Eudoro Acevedo, through an unknown 
(though familiar) country similar to Oklahoma, Texas, or 
the Pampa, in Argentina. These wanderings, at first only in 
space, lead Acevedo to a different time, the future, in 
which he encounters a very tall man simply called ‘Some-
one’ who is 400 years old. This anonymous man explains 
how in this present (Acevedo’s future) facts or history no 
longer matter. People have gotten rid of newspapers, statis-
tics, governments and money, and each individual lives 
only for themselves, without any significant appeal to the 
past. Each one must invent their own science in order to 
solve daily life problems, plant their own food, make the 
furniture they need and produce their own art. Printing has 
been abolished, all museums and libraries have long since 
been abandoned and, with them, all the existing knowledge 
produced in the past and about the past. Every individual 
is a new human race in themselves, with enough time to 
focus on the present, to invent (or discover again and 
again) the most strictly necessary knowledge they need to 
survive, and then to die in the most peaceful way. 
“[E]veryone must be his own Bernard Shaw, his own Jesus 
Christ, his own Archimedes” (Borges 1977, 69). When 
they decide it is time to die, they burn their bodies with all 
their possessions (furniture, tools, handwritten books, 
works of art), that is, with the only thing that constitutes 
now their individual past, and simply wave goodbye.  
I believe Glissant’s account of the situation of the 
peoples in the Caribbean (and by extension some of the 
African descendants in the rest of the Americas) falls in-
between these two images, namely, between these two 
descriptions of an attitude toward the past. The Caribbean 
experience is for Glissant unique because it can be told as 
manifesting a spirit of a people that has never existed be-
fore. According to Glissant, no other group of people has 
been almost artificially invented in this way. Countless 
other communities have been displaced, persecuted, even 
eradicated from the face of the earth, but never before has 
there been such a systematic abduction of millions of peo-
ple, a carefully executed transportation of those millions to 
another continent, and then such a perfectly organized ex-
pansion of their numbers and exploitation of their bodies 
for generations and generations until there was very little 
of their “original” cultures. What this unprecedented “cre-
ation” of a people amounts to is, according to Glissant, 
both a transfer [transbord] and a reinvention. He writes: 
 
There is a difference between the transplanting (by exile or dis-
persion) of a people who continue to survive elsewhere and the 
transfer (by the slave trade) of a population to another place 
where they change into something different, into a new given of 
the world. (DA 40/ Caribbean Discourse 14; translation modi-
fied)9 
 
The latter can no longer be studied as a historical phenom-
enon like any other, because it implies a radical rupture, a 
dislocation at its very beginning. The Caribbean people 
began existing with/in the experience of the slave trade, 
and not before. The result is that this population 
  
has not brought with it, nor collectively continued, the methods 
of existence and survival, both material and spiritual, which it 
practiced before being uprooted. These methods leave only dim 
traces or survive in the form of spontaneous impulses. This is 
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what distinguishes, besides the persecution of one and the en-
slavement of the other, the Jewish Diaspora from the African 
slave trade. (DA 42/15)  
 
This uniqueness of the Caribbean experience leads to a 
paradoxical attitude toward history, one that I would situ-
ate in between Benkos Biohó’s gaze at the Atlantic sea and 
Borges’ utopian future. Perhaps the most succinct account 
of this attitude by Glissant’s can be inferred from the pre-
face to the first edition (1961) of his play Monsieur Tous-
saint [MT]. According to the preface, this play struggles in 
a literary form with the double character of the past for 
some of the peoples in the Caribbean, namely, the experi-
ence of those for which the absence of history10 can be felt 
simultaneously as too much history. 
  
For those whose history has been reduced by others to darkness 
and despair, the recovery of the near or distant past is imperative. 
To renew acquaintance with one’s history, obscured or oblit-
erated by others, is to relish fully the present, for the experience 
of the present, stripped of its roots in time, yields only hollow 
delights. This is a poetic endeavor.  
Of course this attempt seems incomprehensible, indeed useless, if 
not harmful, to those who, far from feeling an absence of history, 
may on the contrary feel that they are laboring under the tyranni-
cal burden of their past.  (MT 7f/15f) 
 
Let us analyze in detail this paradox. On the one hand, it is 
possible to say that a sort of absence of history has been 
imposed by European colonizers and slave traders on the 
descendants of black slaves transported to the “New 
World”. The slave trade as the “beginning” of their history 
is described by Glissant as a “brutal dislocation” (DA 
223/61) of which there is no recollection, performing 
therefore an “erasing of [their] collective memory” (DA 
224/62). This is the sense in which it is possible to say that 
these peoples have no history, or that they have a non-
history [non-historie] that has been created and forced 
upon them. Because of the way the slave trade functioned, 
and particularly, because of the fact that peoples from dif-
ferent backgrounds (with different religions, languages, 
traditions, cultural practices, etc.) were forced to live to-
gether under completely new rules and in a foreign com-
pletely unfamiliar land, the result is the radical severance 
with their previously existing cultures and natural sur-
roundings. There is no possibility of “continuum” between 
their “past” and their new reality, no linearity between 
their previous experiences and their way of coping with 
and apprehending the present. The only chance seems 
either to begin only after the dislocation occurred, that is, 
only two, three, or four hundred years ago, or to yearn nos-
talgically for a connection between culture and nature that 
existed only before and somewhere else (before the trans-
portation, in Africa). This latter attitude might seem closer 
to Biohó’s reflections before his death.  
On the other hand, as a result of the experience of this 
dislocation and the future awaiting those who were being 
transported in the slave ships, the inhabitants of the 
Caribbean would suffer also from what we could call too 
much history, that is, in Glissant’s words, the “tyrannical 
burden of the past,” the weight of a tradition of massacre, 
enslavement, exploitation, impoverishment, segregation, 
etc., that can be experienced as all too present because of 
all of its material effects on the lives of current inhabitants: 
poverty, illiteracy, lack of access to basic public works and 
services, high rates of infant mortality, etc. Such an 
absence is felt, even if colonization makes it impossible 
sometimes to name what causes this state of being, or how 
to combat against it. If we take this burden into account, it 
would be impossible to understand why someone would 
feel the need for more history. The one they have, a couple 
of centuries of living and dying under the worst conditions 
possible, seems to be oppressive enough. Why would they 
want to have even more? Such a concern could lead to the 
decision, accounted for in Borges’ story, to abandon his-
tory and the past altogether, instead of looking for it 
forever on the other side of the ocean.11 
It is at this point where it could be helpful to introduce 
Glissant’s use of “the abyss” [le gouffre], a term he ana-
lyses only later in his thought, but that seems to incorpo-
rate precisely both sides of the paradox.12 Its thematization 
opens indeed Glissant’s Poetics of relation [hereafter PR] 
and becomes one of the most well know motives of his 
theoretical works. The abyss shaped by the Middle Pas-
sage is the paradoxical beginning of the Caribbean history 
and marks the rest of the analysis in PR. It is also mirrored 
in subsequent analyses of images of the history of the 
Caribbean such as the plantation system, colonization, as-
similation, etc.  
Even though the experience of the Middle Passage is 
itself “petrifying,” for Glissant the abyss does not arise 
primarily from what is experienced during the travel, but 
mostly from what is not experienced, namely, from what 
was unknown to millions who did not know what to ex-
pect. Because of this, the abyss can only be opened to the 
imagination of the reader in its poetical form; hence, not as 
a description of the actual conditions of the transported 
slaves, but rather as the evocation of what is not known 
(and unknowable) in the experience itself. We could try to 
put ourselves in their situation, Glissant writes, and imag-
ine how it would be to try to survive during several months 
under such conditions, and yet we would not know what 
was really terrifying about it. This poetic attempt is what is 
captured in the image of the abyss, a canyon without a bot-
tom, a passage that cannot be bridged, a distance that can-
not be covered, an impossible step; a brutal dislocation that 
radically disconnects the past from the present, and that 
uproots the lives of those who are submerged in it. And 
yet, and this is where the paradox lies, it was crossed; a 
people entered the Middle Passage, and a people emerged 
from it. A people began existing in it. The paradox lies in 
the fact that something that by definition—and by its link 
to the unknown—cannot be crossed, was effectively 
crossed; something that devours, consumes, destroys, was 
at the same time, and in that same devouring, a source of 
creation. A non-history was imposed to a people, thereby 
producing with that same gesture the burden of too much 
history. 
Glissant explores three different manifestations of this 
link between the abyss and the unknown, all of which 
seem to perform the same paradoxical mechanism, that is, 
each one of them simultaneously dislocates (and erases) 
collective history while also burdening it with an unbear-
able weight. The first manifestation of this abyss is evoked 
by the image of the “belly of the slave boat.” Glissant 
writes: “For, in your poetic vision, a boat has no belly; a 
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boat does not swallow up, does not devour; a boat is 
steered by open skies. Yet, the belly of this boat dissolves 
you, precipitates you into a nonworld from which you cry 
out” (PR 18/6). In this devouring, however, the boat also 
expels, by vomiting or giving birth to those who made it to 
the other shore. The abyss is in this sense, as Glissant calls 
it, a “womb-abyss.”  
The second manifestation of the abyss is marked by the 
depths of the ocean, filled with millions of chained slaves’ 
corpses who were thrown overboard when they were sick, 
had died because of the conditions under which they were 
being transported, or whenever it was necessary to lighten 
the boat. Even if a continuous, linear trail of the boat could 
be theoretically followed, by tracing these corroded balls 
and chains, gone green by the passage of time, the experi-
ence itself cannot be continuous; there is no connection 
between these corpses by now dissolved in the ocean. The 
ocean with which the life on these shores in the Americas 
begins is made nonetheless out of these decomposed 
corpses of slaves with dysentery, measles, smallpox, or 
simply exhaustion and starvation. The life in the Caribbean 
begins, quite literally, with an ocean filled with death, dis-
ease, and starvation.13  
The third and most “petrifying face of the abyss,” 
writes Glissant, “lies far ahead of the slave ship’s bow, a 
pale murmur; you do not know if it is a storm cloud, rain 
or drizzle, or smoke from a comforting fire” (PR 18f/6f). 
In this voyage into the unknown, the future (physical and 
temporal) vanishes into something that can only remain as 
a murmur coming from an eternal ahead. The abyss breaks 
effectively with this future, but also lets this future con-
stantly resonate, even until today. It promises an end (in 
both senses of the word: a final and a completion) to this 
traumatic Middle Passage, and end to slavery, colonialism, 
exploitation, etc., namely, it promises a future that can 
only be a projection of the past, of the other shore. Glissant 
writes: “Paralleling this mass of water, the third metamor-
phosis of the abyss thus projects a reverse image of all that 
had been left behind, not to be regained for generations 
except –more and more threadbare– in the blue savannas 
of memory and imagination” (PR 19/7).14 
Glissant highlights three different aspects of the abyss 
through this poetic evocation of its the three-fold image. 
First, the travel of the slave ship through the ocean marks 
the impossibility of piling up these experiences chrono-
logically, the impossibility of the sedimentation that would 
make it possible for the Caribbean people to trace their his-
tory linearly back to Africa. Second, it also tarnishes this 
passage, and the history that begins with it, with the 
abominable experience of millions of human beings who 
suffered the particular conditions of being treated, trans-
ported, and killed in this way. Third, a consequence of the 
two former, the Middle Passage constitutes above all a be-
ginning [commencement] capable of turning the unknown 
into knowledge. Glissant writes: “the land-beyond turned 
into a land-in-itself. And this undreamt of sail, finally now 
spread, is watered by the white wind of the abyss. Thus, 
the absolute unknown, projected by the abyss and bearing 
into eternity the womb abyss and the infinite abyss, in the 
end became knowledge” (PR 20/8). The petrifying un-
known is thus transformed into “knowledge”; the abyss 
goes beyond itself by always carrying itself with it. Such 
knowledge is neither a nostalgic gaze at a destroyed 
civilization beyond the sea, nor an arrogant disregard for 





The description of the beginning of the history of the 
Caribbean thus resembles in its paradoxical structure a 
“traumatic” experience; in particular, as I would like to 
show, the paradoxical, abyssal beginning of the Middle 
Passage evokes the specific description of trauma that 
authors like Cathy Caruth have developed in the field of 
trauma and literary studies.15 In this section I will review 
Caruth’s account of trauma and how it relates to Glissant’s 
description of a birth of the Caribbean; in particular, I will 
address some of the common criticisms of this framework, 
and why I think Caruth’s version does not fall in any of 
them, making its comparison with the Caribbean experi-
ence even more fruitful.  
In her book Unclaimed Experience, Caruth offers a re-
interpretation of traumatic experience that highlights its 
paradoxical character. Departing from what she calls mod-
ern trauma theory (see UE 63), this approximation not only 
focuses on the evident devastating aspects of traumatic ex-
perience, but also on the fact that inhabiting trauma pre-
supposes, first of all, having survived an “original” but in-
locatable shocking experience. Thus, Caruth writes, 
“trauma is not simply an effect of destruction but also, 
fundamentally, the enigma of survival. It is only by recog-
nizing traumatic experience as a paradoxical relation be-
tween destructiveness and survival that we can also recog-
nize the legacy of incomprehensibility at the heart of cata-
strophic experience” (UE 58, my emphasis).  
I would like to bring this paradox closer to my analysis 
of the abyssal beginning of the history of the Caribbean, 
following at least in three paths. First, traumatic occur-
rence is not only something that signals an extreme dislo-
cation, inscribing a break between two moments in history 
or in the life of a person; it entails also a creative aspect, 
which goes beyond the paralyzing effects of the “original” 
experience. Second, there is a connection between (at 
least) two moments in the occurrence that mark a new 
form of temporality, described by Freud as ‘belatedness.’16 
Trauma, Freud explains, only occurs after the “fact,” in a 
second moment in which the first original event comes 
back and is relived in another light, with another meaning, 
with an unbearable force. Third (and perhaps more impor-
tantly), the event itself to which we are referring (the 
abyss, the traumatic experience) is barely an “event,” since 
we lack a means to construct it into something known, 
understandable, graspable, and yet, it constitutes the de-
finitive beginning of a new life, the life of survival. There 
is no memory attached to it, and it precludes any way of 
constructing in a definitive way such a memory. Its belated 
character does not point to a past experience available to 
the individual (or a community) as part of the stream of 
consciousness.   
Let us then analyze the structure of trauma, according 
to these three elements, following Caruth’s reconstruction. 
Traumatic experience relates to events that are so sudden, 
catastrophic, or unexpected, that our response only begins 
to take shape afterwards, in flashbacks or repetitions that 
cannot be controlled by the traumatized person (see UE 
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11). This does not mean that the location of trauma lies in 
the event itself, or in a set of characteristics, because dif-
ferent subjects react in different ways to the same event. 
“[T]he pathology consists, rather,” Caruth writes, “solely 
in the structure of its experience or reception: the event is 
not assimilated or experienced fully at the time, but only 
belatedly, in its repeated possession of the one who experi-
ences it. To be traumatized is precisely to be possessed by 
an image or event” (Caruth 1995, 4f). Trauma is thus, just 
as the abyss in Glissant, marked by its ultimate connection 
to the unknown, to what is ungraspable in the experience 
itself, and not by the terrifying, actual events.    
Freud’s examples are the nightmares and flashbacks of 
soldiers who have returned from the war apparently unaf-
fected, or the victim of an accident who only begins to suf-
fer symptoms days after the event. In experiences such as 
these, the subject’s relationship to the event is so over-
whelming, or occurs so unexpectedly, that the subject does 
not appear to be truly “present” at the event. Trauma re-
lates in this sense to an absence of understanding, one has 
not yet lived through the experience of the event. Caruth 
writes: “The shock of the mind's relation to the threat of 
death is thus not the direct experience of the threat, but 
precisely the missing of this experience, the fact that, not 
being experienced in time, it has not yet been fully 
known” (UE 62). In the aftermath of the event, however, 
this absence leads to a belated excess the survivor cannot 
deal with: flashbacks, repetitions, symptoms of trauma. In 
extreme cases, the survivor is unable to move forward and 
remains caught up in an experience that, paradoxically, 
they never had.  
Caruth’s interest, however, does not lie only at the in-
dividual level of the traumatized, but moreover at the level 
of history, or perhaps, one should say, at the level of what 
these insights on the structure of traumatic experience have 
in relation to our understanding of history.17 Even further, I 
believe Caruth wants to insist on an inherently traumatic 
structure of history (or some instances of it18), developed 
in her 2013 book Literature in the Ashes of History [here-
after LAH], where the question is explicitly raised in terms 
of the possibility of bearing witness to a history that erases 
itself, that erases its own traces, and thus a past that works 
in the undoing of its own possibility. What is at stake here 
seems to be the structure of history, and how in some it 
functions precisely by suppressing memory. Thus, history 
as erasure makes it impossible to access its own past, and 
at the same time, encounters the imperative to return. See, 
for example, Caruth analysis of Freud reading of the 
dreams and memories of soldiers who came back from the 
WWI: 
  
No longer capable of interpreting these memories as expressions 
of unconscious desire, Freud came to understand them as repeti-
tions of the experiences that the soldiers could not grasp, a form 
of memory that, in enacting what it could not recall, also passed 
on a historical event that this memory erased. These memories, in 
other words, in repeating and erasing, did not represent but rather 
enacted history: the made history by also erasing it. (LAH 78) 
 
This is the conception of “traumatic history” that I find 
particularly relevant to understand the history of the 
Caribbean as presented by Glissant. The intolerability of 
the excess of history (the need to return again and again in 
order to understand) is created precisely by a dislocation 
that erases history, producing thereby an absence. This ab-
sence is marked in Glissant’s work in the continuous lack 
of a link between nature and culture, that is, between the 
community’s’ relation to its surroundings and the accumu-
lation of experiences. Caribbean communities live in a 
constant state of suffering as a consequence of the imposi-
tion of a history (of enslavement, colonialism and dispos-
session) that simultaneously erases its traces and imposes 
itself as a non-history.   
Before showing how this reading of trauma arising 
from Caruth’s works can be used to understand some as-
pects of Glissant’s reconstruction of the Caribbean history, 
I would like to address two usual criticisms of the use of 
the framework of trauma in connection to history, and 
show why the reconstruction I have offered so far could 
eventually avoid both. Authors such as Dominick LaCapra 
have warned against the perils of taking a paradoxical 
structure of trauma as a way to approach the experiences 
of painful historical events. This move, LaCapra insists, 
can result in a complicated and often counterproductive 
attitude towards history. By uncritically accepting a trau-
matic structure of history, we run the risk of being para-
lyzed in two different ways. Each of these risks corre-
sponds to putting too much weight on one of the sides of 
the paradox, and therefore losing the ability to give any 
meaning:19  
i) The first risk is to fall in a totalizing, archival attitude 
when confronted to the specificities of the traumatic ex-
perience, an attitude that leads to being unable to assign 
any meaning to it. When dealing with traumatic experi-
ences, it is easy to put too much emphasis on the excessive 
violence, and all the details and particularities, of the event 
that we call ‘traumatic.’ It is what we do when we circle 
around the injustice, the pain, the literal descriptions of 
violence and suffering, over and over again, because we 
have too much to say. But, by focusing on the event as if it 
were the cause of trauma, it is easy to forget that being 
traumatized means, among other things, surviving the 
event, that is, leaving in a sense the event behind. This 
amounts to staying only on one side of the paradox, what 
Caruth calls the devastating or destructive side of trauma, 
or what I would call, following Glissant, the too much his-
tory of colonized communities. By situating ourselves ex-
clusively on this side of the paradox, we would be thinking 
again and again of the intolerability of the event, preclude 
the possibility of assigning any meaning to it other than 
negativity and disruption; there is no way to categorize, 
and therefore understand, if we obstinately refuse to move 
beyond the excessive character of the experience. This is 
connected, in LaCapra’s analysis, to an archival account of 
the past.  
ii) But it is also possible to become paralyzed with the 
traumatic structure of history if we stay too much on the 
side of the absence of history, that is, on the fact that the 
erasure of the events, or the fact that they are barely 
events, makes it difficult to offer a chronological, under-
standable account of “what happened.” This often leads to 
a melancholic attitude toward history, one that emphasizes 
the absence of experience at the heart of trauma. If the sur-
vivor cannot even “explain” or give an account of the 
event, there is no way to make sense of it, neither for that 
person, nor for those of us who are trying to understand its 
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history; there is simply nothing to say. By emphasizing 
this side of the absence of meaning (a difference absence 
of meaning than the previous risk entailed), we run then 
the risk of refusing to say something about it, because 
nothing would be faithful, because there are no possible 
frameworks through which we could grasp the specificities 
of the traumatic event, because attempting to reduce 
someone’s unbearable pain to a sense would be an affront 
to it. Adopting this attitude toward a traumatic structure of 
the event would imply surrendering to the side of non-
history, the absence or erasure of it. But accepting this im-
possibility risks, LaCapra suggests, a sacralization of 
trauma, either by way of sublimation (making it something 
that can never be overcome, that will always haunt those 
who are affected by it), or by adopting a paralyzed melan-
cholic, mournful. 
Caruth’s approach not only does not fall in any of the 
two sides of the paradox, but offers a way of remaining 
rather in the space opened by them, at the site of trauma, 
and not in an attempt to escape it or to completely over-
come it. i) Caruth is not interested in locating what makes 
an event traumatic, but rather in the response to such an 
event, both on the part of the survivor, and on the part of 
those who are there to listen to their story. In this sense, 
Caruth does not dwell on the excess itself, on the too much 
history, and on the paralyzing effects of this perspective. 
She focuses instead on the fact of the survival, and there-
fore, on the temporality of a present opened up by the be-
latedness of the traumatic experience. As it is clear in 
LAH, the question to ask is rather “In what way is the ex-
perience of trauma also the experience of an imperative to 
live? What is the nature of a life that continues beyond 
trauma?” (7) ii) On the other hand, Caruth’s position is 
also not situated only on the side of the absence of history, 
by restating the radical absence of frameworks to under-
stand or make sense of trauma. There is indeed a history to 
investigate, a truth that is communicated by the voice com-
ing out of the traumatic wound, and thus it is necessary to 
reject in Caruth a claim to non-history.20   
For Caruth, this two-fold attitude toward the experi-
ence of trauma, requires investigating a “new kind of lis-
tening.” She writes: “To listen to the crisis of a trauma, 
that is, is not only to listen for the event, but to hear in the 
testimony the survivor’s departure from it; the challenge of 
the therapeutic listener, in other words, is how to listen to 
departure” (1995, 10). This listening to departure conveys 
the demand of the paradoxical beginning of the Caribbean 
I have outlined above following Glissant. The abyss, one 
could say, also demands in Glissant, as in Caruth, “a 
speaking and a listening from the site of trauma [that] does 
not rely, I would suggest, on what we simply know of each 
other, but on what we don’t yet know of our own traumatic 
pasts” (Caruth 1995, 11).  
It is this idea of trauma as a site from out of which it is 
possible to listen, especially when most of what surrounds 
this site is unknown, that I want to investigate in Glissant’s 
notion of the abyss. Caruth’s main example of history as 
this traumatic departure comes from a reading of Freud’s 
Moses and Monotheism, and more precisely, she suggests, 
from his own traumatic dealing with history in the essay 
(see UE 12-18).  But in the case of Glissant, the fact that 
the creation of culture depends on this very same depar-
ture seems to me even more evidently connected to the dis-
location of culture involved in the creation of a people in 
the Caribbean. The Middle Passage is still in a sense a site; 
how then can it be the location of a dislocation? More im-
portantly, how can we depart from this dislocating site? 
How can it be also a site of reconnection, creation, and 





In my reconstruction of the paradoxical stance toward his-
tory arising out of the abyss I have also shown that Glis-
sant’s understanding of the Middle Passage does not fall in 
neither of the excesses that LaCapra fears when accepting 
trauma as a framework for understanding history. As is the 
case with Caruth and LaCapra, Glissant also wants this 
paradox not to be paralyzing, and in this sense, it seems 
that the framework of trauma (the paradoxes involved in 
it) works well to describe the abyssal character of the 
Caribbean: i) On the one hand, there is no paralyzing, ar-
chival excess of details, nor an obsession with the violent 
particularities of the experience; in fact, as I have said, the 
abyss does not lie on the experience itself, horrific as it is, 
of being transported from one side of the Atlantic Ocean to 
the other, but rather on the relationship of this passage to 
the unknown, namely, to what has not been (yet) experi-
enced.21 ii) On the other hand, Glissant’s evocation does 
not lead to a paralyzing affirmation of an absence of mean-
ing. The abyss created something, meant something, resul-
ted in something that we can investigate. And this investi-
gation can only be started out from a present of surviving, 
which is so rich that it has become “a new region of the 
world,” as Glissant’s title for one of his last books sug-
gests.  
 This double structure of Glissant’s analysis also be-
comes clear in his opposition between what he calls 
(Caribbean) histories and what he takes to be a 
Westernized notion of History, with a capital H.  Right af-
ter he wonders about the validity of the framework of 
trauma in his Note 1 “Concerning history as neurosis” (DA 
229/65f), Glissant adds a second note responding to this 
interpretation. He entitles it “Concerning transversality:” 
 
However, our diverse histories in the Caribbean have produced 
today another revelation: that of their subterranean convergence. 
They, thereby, bring to light an unsuspected, because it is so ob-
vious, dimension of human behavior: transversality. The irruption 
[L’irruption] itself of Caribbean history (of the converging his-
tories of our peoples) relieves us of the linear, hierarchical vision 
of a single History that would run its unique course. It is not this 
History that has roared around the edge of the Caribbean, but ac-
tually a question of the subterranean convergence of our his-
tories. The depths are not only the abyss [abysse] of neurosis but 
primarily the site [lieu] of multiple converging paths. (DA 
66/230; translation modified; my emphasis) 
 
In this crucial passage Glissant confirms that the frame-
work of trauma would not be sufficient to speak about the 
experience in the Caribbean, if by ‘trauma’ we understand 
“only the abyss [abysse] of neurosis,” that is, the paralyz-
ing impossibility to go beyond the disruption. It is possible 
to break with this neurotic paralysis by emphasizing the 
productive, creative side of the abyss (perhaps as gouffre, 
MIGUEL GUALDRÓN RAMÍREZ 
 158 
as described in the first section of this paper) and the his-
tories that connect the multiple ramifications of the middle 
passage itself. Such ramifications, as it becomes clear in 
the quote above, reveal spatial, and not only temporal, 
connections of transversality. The abyss is a site that dis-
rupts and connects, breaks apart while also branching his-
tories together.22   
But we can take a step further. If we take seriously the 
spatiality of this transversality, I believe that these “con-
verging histories of our people” would do more than just 
reinscribing the paradoxical framework of trauma. The 
transversality of Caribbean histories puts into question the 
need to accept a traumatic framework as the ultimate way 
in which the history of the Caribbean can be approached. 
As I will show in what follows, the converging paths allow 
for a second form of disruption, one that challenges what I 
would call ‘the future necessity’ of the paradox. Glissant’s 
interest (at least in DA) is eminently decolonial, and to de-
colonize in this context means, as I will suggest, to attempt 
a de-traumatization of the Caribbean, to relieve the too 
much history that becomes too little, and the too little that 
has become too much. With this gesture (with this em-
phasis on transversality) Glissant would be taking a step 
beyond Caruth (and Acosta López’s) responses to the de-
mand of trauma: for the Martinican thinker, the demand is 
indeed to find a way to listen to the departure, but in order 
to go beyond the paradox  with regard to history.  
Can the paradox of history be loosened? And can it be 
untied in connection to a decolonizing critique of the pres-
ent? I have shown that the abyss, taken as a beginning of 
the Caribbean history, is unsurpassable; it effectively 
breaks any possible linearity with Africa, and thus, in a 
sense, the abyss will always remain part of its history. And 
yet, if this abyss was externally imposed on African slaves, 
this means that the non-(too-much)-history is also an ex-
ternal imposition, one that could be overcome if the weight 
is lifted. Glissant’s analysis does not claim that the struc-
ture of every event is traumatic. Neither does he argue that 
there is something like a traumatic character of historicity. 
Rather, it is only the very particular (exclusive, perhaps) 
history of the Caribbean that opens a paradoxical concep-
tion of history.23 The reason why this difference is relevant 
is to recognize that, in Glissant, the experience that leads 
to a paradoxical attitude towards history is not produced 
by history itself, but rather by an external imposition on 
the enslaved Africans, and then the people in the Carib-
bean, by the forces of slavery, colonialism, and assimila-
tion. The Caribbean seems to be an exception to a tradi-
tional History, and since the paradox is externally im-
posed, the Caribbean can be liberated from it. So, if this is 
possible, should Caribbean communities attempt such 
liberation? What would it entail to lift off this void that 
weighs so much? 
Transversality offers a new form of connection. Ac-
cording to the paradox, what forces the intolerability of the 
burden is the concealment of the history of the people in 
the Caribbean, the imposition of a non-history, and not the 
possibility of history and memory itself. To accuse the 
peoples in the Caribbean of having a non-history is only 
possible if we accept a philosophical perspective on his-
tory that assumes that the only possible history comes 
from a continuum, a History. But, 
 
the lived circumstances of this daily [Caribbean] reality do not 
form part of a continuum, which means that its relation with its 
surroundings (what we would call its nature) is in a discontinu-
ous relation to its accumulation of experiences (what we would 
call its culture). In such a context, history, as far as it is a disci-
pline and claims to clarify the reality lived by this people, will 
suffer from a serious epistemological deficiency: it will not know 
how to make the link. (DA 223/61; my emphasis)  
 
In order to “make the link,” it would be futile to offer a 
linear connection as if the abyss had never existed. But it is 
possible to make the link in a nonlinear way. The intoler-
able weight of an absence of experiences (of not hearing, 
not being fully present, not being able to relate to the new 
environment) can be lifted; it is possible to reconstitute 
history in order to connect nature and culture.24 To be sure, 
this creation of the link does not amount to putting into 
question the abyssal character of the Caribbean, to forget it 
(like in Borges’ Utopia, perhaps), or to move beyond it as 
something that has no effect in the present; rather it im-
plies taking the abyss as a beginning, and not as the fate of 
the peoples in the Caribbean. Read from a Glissantian per-
spective (at least in DA), any attempt to uncritically accept 
the framework of trauma implies not only acknowledging 
the validity of the paradoxical structure of its history, but 
also taking the conditions of colonialism as necessary and 
unavoidable. If histories can be created, however, if the 
connection between nature and culture can be recreated, 
trauma has to begin to fade, because the history (or better, 
histories) that emerge from it would no longer be felt as 
too much. 
In this sense, the question becomes a different one: not 
only how to narrate or bear witness to trauma, or how to 
rethink language in order to find a new way of listening to 
what was so far inaudible,25 but how to disrupt the colonial 
link between nature and culture and create a new one that 
will be able to overcome the vertigo of history, and thus 
render the paradox inoperative.26 No longer, then, how to 
witness the paradox and its survival, but rather how to lift 
the externally imposed weight; how to reconnect, reconsti-
tute, posses, this spatio-temporality that has never been 
possessed by these communities. 
Glissant’s answer in DA begins with what he calls 
“counterpoetics”, or “forced poetics”, and the struggle to 
turn them into a form of “natural poetics.” This is the sub-
ject of two decisive sections in DA, “Natural poetics, 
Forced poetics” and “Cross-cultural Poetics [Poétique de 
la Relation]” (DA 401-431/120-142). In these sections, 
Glissant defends the idea that the only possible form (so 
far) of expression in the French Antilles is a forced one. As 
opposed to a natural form of expression, in which a mani-
festation flows freely even if it is uttered against an op-
pressive power, a forced (or counter-) poetics is one in 
which its own manifestation negates itself from the very 
beginning (see DA 401f/120.) Such is the case, for exam-
ple, with the way Antilleans speak French and Creole. The 
former is (for Creole speaking communities) a language 
that inhibits expression because it always feels foreign, 
and insufficient. French seems to follow a different logic, 
different from their “own” language. However, and at the 
same time, Creole, 
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which could have led to a natural poetics (because in it language 
[langue] and expression [langage] would correspond perfectly) is 
being exhausted. It is becoming more French in its daily use; it is 
becoming vulgarized in the transition from spoken to written. 
Creole has, however, always resisted this dual deformation. 
Forced poetics is the result of these deformations and this resist-
ance. (DA 403/121) 
 
Creole itself has always been a forced way of resisting the 
external impositions that are part of the mechanisms of 
slavery and colonialism, such as the plantation; a way to 
“reject” and “defy” French and to create a language differ-
ent from the one used by the slave-owner, one that the lat-
ter could not understand.27 However, since the plantation 
system was never replaced by a new form of production, 
and its abolition led simply to other extractive and exploit-
ative forms of labor, Creole did never metamorphose into a 
“natural” form of poetics. Perhaps as opposed to any other 
well-established language (see DA 410-413/127f) it be-
came traditional (and with it, the form of life that corres-
ponds) as an expression that is derisive, always going 
against itself and the possibilities to move toward a natural 
form of manifestation.28  
As the example of Creole shows, forced poetics does 
not lead to a connection between culture and nature, but 
merely to a “detour, diversion” [détour] in its tactic of re-
sistance. It is still “an unconscious body of knowledge 
through which the popular consciousness asserts both its 
rootlessness and its density. We must however move from 
this unconscious awareness to a conscious knowledge of 
itself” (DA 418/132). Thus, such a strategy is necessary, 
but not sufficient, if the goal is to finally connect that 
which has never been connected on this side of the ocean. 
As it becomes clear in one of the first sections of DA, “Le 
retour et le détour,” diversion strategies must be coupled 
with tactics of reversion. This means that an attempt at de-
colonization means not only using the language as a form 
of resistance, which all colonized communities already do, 
but also as a form of self-expression. Glissant writes: 
   
We must return to the point from which we started. Diversion 
[détour] is not a useful ploy unless it is nourished by reversion: 
not a return to the longing for origins, to the immutable One of 
Being, but a return to the point of entanglement from which we 
were forcefully turned away; this is where we must ultimately put 
to work the forces of Relation, or perish. (DA 56f/26; translation 
modified) 
 
This point of entanglement, as the quote makes clear, is 
not an idealized, mythical point of origin; not the time in 
Africa, nor even the moment of the abyss, which has been 
shown as a non-experience. As a matter of fact, it cannot 
be a moment in time or history, since it has never been the 
case that Caribbean communities have successfully con-
nected culture and nature. It is, I would suggest, a spatial 
point, and not merely a temporal one. The Caribbean itself 
is the site from which communities have been deranged, 
and the place where they have to return in order to finally 
achieve a true expression of themselves. And the Carib-
bean, as a site itself, is revealed as a “multiple series of re-
lationships [une multi-relation],” where transversality be-
comes a new form of history.  “For us,” Glissant writes, 
“this place is not only the land where our people were 
transplanted, it is also the history they shared (lived as 
non-history) with other communities, with whom the link 
is becoming apparent today. Our place is the Caribbean” 
(DA 426/139; my emphasis).  
The task is then to return to the Caribbean as a site, a 
place of and in history that, nevertheless, has begun in the 
abyss of the Middle passage as a traumatic experience. 
According to Caruth, “trauma seems to be much more than 
a pathology, or the simple illness of a wounded psyche: it 
is always the story of a wound that cries out, that addresses 
us in the attempt to tell us of a reality or truth that is not 
otherwise available” (UE 4). How does the reality of the 
abyss address us? What is the wound of the Middle Pas-
sage inviting us to do? The wound of the Middle Passage 
does not cry out to be preserved, idealized or romanticized, 
and also not to be represented (representation as rational 
knowledge is impossible in the abyss); as Caruth and 
Acosta López show in regard to the traumatic wound, the 
abyss indeed calls and demands to be heard, and carries 
with it a resistance to the threat of forgetting about this re-
ality that we have not been able to hear before. But follow-
ing Glissant, these voicing and listening (what he calls 
‘self-expression’), this refusal to forget, do not only have 
the aim of witnessing or accompanying the wound, but of 
healing it.29 It is perhaps in listening to it that it can be 
healed, because it allows for the construction of a new 
kind of reality. That this wound can be healed does not 
mean to erase it from history. The abyss will always have 
been a beginning of the Caribbean.  But it does mean that 
the paradox of history that coloniality presently imposes 
on the traumatized communities of the Caribbean can be 
overcome, by lifting the weight of the too much history 
and filling up the space of the too little. This is what Glis-
sant means by the idea of a reconnection of these commu-
nities with themselves: “Herein lies one of the objectives 
of our discourse: reconnect in a profound way with our-
selves, so that the strategy of diversion would no longer be 
maintained as a tactic indispensable to existence but would 






The possibility of reconnection, of self-expression, of tak-
ing transversality seriously and coming back to the point 
of entanglement, implies a new understanding of spatiality 
altogether. This would allow, in turn, a creation of a new a 
form of temporality understood in terms of histories, and 
not History. Whether this makes it possible for the Carib-
bean communities to alleviate the weight of an externally 
imposed non-history that feels like too much history, that 
is the question and the task of Glissant’s poetics. It is a 
matter, as we have seen, of developing a form of poetics 
that combines two tactics of resistance, by linking a tem-
poral question with a spatial one, namely, not only resist-
ing the language, the culture of the ruler, but also being 
able to construct one’s own reality in words. Finally, it is a 
way to start hearing what was impossible to hear before, to 
relieve traumatized communities of the history of this 
trauma by enabling a new way of listening and speaking. 
The task is not to discover a reality that runs the risk of be-
coming out of reach, but to create one in language. The 
possibility of linking culture and nature would not absolve 
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the Caribbean from its abyssal beginnings making appar-
ent the need to find a new temporal approach30 that can 
make sense of the disruption; rather, it absolves the Carib-
bean from an abyssal future, which in this context would 
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1 It is important to say that Glissant himself opens up this possible link 
with trauma in Le Discours antillais [hereafter DA], on a brief passage 
titled “Concerning history as neurosis”: “Would it be ridiculous to consi-
der our lived history as a steadily advancing neurosis? To see the Slave 
Trade as a traumatic shock, our relocation (in the new land) as a repressi-
ve phase, slavery as the period of latency, “emancipation” in 1848 as re-
activation, our everyday fantasies as symptoms, and even our horror of 
“returning to those things of the past” as a possible manifestation of the 
neurotic’s fear of his past? Would it not be useful and revealing to inve-
stigate such a parallel? What is repressed in our history persuades us, 
furthermore, that this is more than an intellectual game.” (DA 229/65f) 
See also Acosta López’s essay in the present special issue for another side 
of the possible connections suggested by this passage.  
2 The former is the case of the analysis of trauma made by Pablo Oyarzún 
(2007) in relation to Latin America in general, for whom trauma is the 
 
 
“rhythm of every experience” (17); the latter is thematized by Drabisnki 
(2010) in relation to the Caribbean. Oyarzún and Drabinski’s approaches 
alter in this way the usual European approach to history and its 
connection to the past. I will return briefly to both of these texts, although 
my approach to trauma is interested in moving towards a different per-
spective. 
3 In this text, my analysis comes primarily from Glissant’s third (and per-
haps most well-known) collection of essays, Le Discours antillais (1981), 
and pays a special attention to the image of the abyss (which is directly 
analyzed by Glissant in his fourth book of essays, Poétique de la Relation 
(1990)). Even though I use this image, my text does not present a reading 
of the latter book, which I believe would require a a different conception 
of the radical disruption of history connected to the question of trauma. 
The analysis of such a conception must be carried out in a different place. 
See footnote 24. 
4 The possibility of reading Glissant’s approach to Caribbean history in 
terms of trauma was first suggested to me by Elizabeth Rottenberg after a 
paper I read at a student colloquium at DePaul University in March, 
2015; I have not stopped thinking about this possibility ever since. The 
present text is perhaps an attempt to offer the answer I would have wan-
ted to have at hand that afternoon.  
5 I take this notion from Drabinski’s “Aesthetics and the abyss”, which 
investigates the consequences of Glissant’s account of the abyss in an 
aesthetic context. (see 2015, 141).  
6 The life of Benkos Biohó, precisely because of his outlaw character and 
his fierce combat against slavery, is barely documented in the official 
history of Cartagena, and yet has become the founding myth of the strug-
gles of Afro-Colombians in Colombia. While it is difficult to find many 
written historical and literary accounts about his life, the oral traditions of 
the black peoples in the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of Colombia are full 
of Biohó’s stories. Furthermore, the written accounts of his life greatly 
differ from one another. Thus, whereas in Burgos Cantor’s text Biohó 
was born in Africa, in Changó el gran putas, the monumental work by 
Manuel Zapata Olivella, he is born in Cartagena, and thus represents in 
the most powerful way what the author calls the American Muntu. 
7 “In front of the sea Benkos Biohó king of the Matuna is going to be 
hanged. I close my eyes and I don’t see my land. Sea and Sea. My gods 
do not come. The village of my parents the brothers have become invisi-
ble. I say father; nothing comes. I say mother; nothing comes. Home; 
nothing appears. Beloved I say; a stone the skin of a dead frog on the be-
ach a void that absorbs and pushes announces itself in my chest and does 
not fit.” (My translation) 
8 We could for example compare this impossibility with the actual at-
tempts of later movements to “go back,” such as “the “Back-to-Africa 
movement” (19th century) or the different forms of Black Zionism (for 
example, versions of Rastafarianism) in the 20th century. 
9 I will sometimes modify the English translation of Le Discours antillais 
and Poétique de la Relation to be consistent with some of the concepts 
used in Michael Dash and Betsy Wing’s translations respectively. I inclu-
de the pages of the French original first and then of the existing transla-
tion.  
10 For an interesting reading of the idea of having (almost) no history 
from the point of view of Latin America, see Oyarzún 2007. If history has 
been erased for us, Oyarzún argues, this can be both devastating and libe-
rating; it can mean oblivion and desperation. It can also mean that, like 
children (new to the world), we are nothing but futurity and openness. 
Oyarzún discusses these two possibilities, suggesting that there could be a 
different form of relating to theses two aspects of Latin America history 
(see Oyarzún 2007, 12f).  
11 Aimé Césaire and Frantz Fanon are usually taken, respectively, as de-
fending the need for a return to the (African) past and a radical break with 
it. Even though the images I am referring to here in connection to Glis-
sant could be taken as examples of Césairean and Fanonian attitudes, I 
believe that both of their interpretations reduce the complexity of their 
thought to formulas that are misleading. I cannot show this point here in 
any detail, cf. Gualdrón Ramírez 2019.  
12 Glissant uses the terms gouffre, abîme, and abysse, all translated by 
Betsy Wing and Michael Dash as “abyss” in DA and PR. Whereas the 
latter, le abysse, is used to emphasize the negative, destructive side of the 
abyss (see for example DA 66/230), Glissant employs the two former 
terms, particularly gouffre, to denote a productive, creative side.  
13 “In actual fact the abyss is a tautology: the entire ocean, the entire sea 
gently collapsing in the end into the pleasures of sand, make one vast 
beginning, but a beginning whose time is marked by these balls and 
chains gone green” (DA 18/6).   
14 This is precisely the emphasis that Drabinski draws on the futurity of 
the structure of trauma, and in particular on the possibility of a memory 
of the future (see Drabisnki 2010, 296). It is what he has called elsewhe-
 
ON POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITS OF USING THE FRAMEWORK OF TRAUMA IN GLISSANT’S PHILOSOPHY OF CARIBBEAN HISTORY 
 161 
 
re “the obstinacy of the future” (2011, 4) or the demand for “imagining a 
future” (2015, 160). As I have mentioned before, this constitutes a diffe-
rent, but perhaps compatible version of trauma to the one I have been 
analyzing so far. For another threefold version of the Glissantian abyss, 
see Drabinski 2010, 297-303. 
15 I am indebted to María del Rosario Acosta López and the students of 
her class on Trauma and Memory in Latin America (Fall 2016) at DePaul 
University for this characterization of the paradoxical structure of trauma, 
and the analysis of the risks of adopting this paradox for a reading of hi-
storical events. I have also drawn from personal conversations with Cathy 
Caruth, in particular the sessions around her more recent work, in the 
Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, in 2014, organized by the research 
group on Law and Violence of the same university. It has been a privilege 
to be able to discuss the works of these authors in person, and it has 
strongly shaped my interpretation of their works. 
16 Elizabeth Rottenberg 2014 17f offers a clear explanation of 
Nachtraglichkeit. As Rottenberg suggests in the final pages of the paper, 
Nachträglichkeit (from Beyond the Pleasure Principle on) must be under-
stood not as an accidental connection of one event with a previous one, 
but perhaps more as a structural delay in the event, and could even mark 
the temporal structure of experience itself. Rottenberg’s conclusion, 
however, defends that, at least in an individual level, “for Freud, not only 
are we not all traumatized […], but we are also not all traumatizable” 
(2014, 21).  
17 The latter seems to be the suggestion by Acosta López in her reading of 
Caruth’s work, in particular in connection to what she calls “grammars of 
listening” or “grammars of silence.” Departing from Caruth’s work, Aco-
sta López shows that history itself requires a new framework when faced 
with the challenges that the structure of traumatic experience poses to our 
traditional conceptions of temporality, representation, memory, etc. Such 
a framework needs to respond to the epistemological and ethical demands 
of traumatic experiences. In her own words: “Se trata pues de una verdad 
–de una dimensión de la experiencia, e incluso, de aquello que concebi-
mos como experiencia– que desde su naturaleza irrepresentable (pues 
cómo representar aquello que aún no se ha hecho presente) exige ser es-
cuchada y comprendida en y desde su incomprensibilidad. Se trata de 
aprender “a ver y a escuchar de otro modo,” dice Caruth, desde ese lugar-
no lugar abierto por la experiencia traumática, desde el evento que se in-
augura justamente en aquella “incomprensión”, y desde la resistencia que 
el “lenguaje del trauma” ofrece a la representación y a la clausura de sen-
tido.” (See Acosta López 2017) 
18 I read a certain ambivalence in Caruth’s works regarding whether all 
history has a traumatic structure (that is, “no longer straightforwardly 
referential” (UE 11)), or if it is rather just some instances of it: “a new 
history of disappearance”, or a type of erasure, “new to the twentieth cen-
tury” (LAH 79), in particular twentieth century’s history as read by A-
rendt, Freud, Lacan, Derrida, etc. (see LAH xi 76f, 88). On the one hand, 
it seems that there is something in the experience itself as arising from the 
analysis of trauma that opens up a new way to conceiving history altoge-
ther. See, for example, the following passage: “I will suggest that it is in 
the notion of history that Freud offers in this work, as well as in the way 
his writing itself confronts historical events, that we may need to rethink 
the possibility of history, as well as our ethical and political relation to it” 
(UE 12). However, Caruth’s analyses always come from particular in-
stances of trauma, even historical trauma, in a way that resists generaliza-
tion, because not every instance of what we want to call history is the 
aftermath of war, totalitarianism, displacement, torture, etc., which are 
the cases Caruth’s books focus on. Thus, these questions could be phra-
sed in the following way: is the structure of history itself (what we could 
call historicity), something we should rethink in terms of a past that does 
not exhaust itself in, but is always questioned by, the futurity of our own 
attempts to cope with what we cannot understand? Or do we grasp the 
non-referentiality of history only in particular cases of collective trauma? 
I believe these questions should also be addressed by Glissant, in order to 
inquire whether the figure of the abyss can be extended to other instances 
of history, or perhaps even to all history.  
19 See LaCapra 2009, 65. To be clear, LaCapra is not suggesting that the-
se paralyzing responses to traumatic events constitute mistaken attitudes, 
or even reactions that we should prevent. Victims of such events become 
paralyzed almost by definition, and we would be doing nothing to help or 
even understand them if we take their responses as erroneous. What the 
author is trying to deal with is the theoretical response of psychoanalysis 
and trauma theory scholars, who might also become paralyzed by respon-
ding to the paradox of trauma in an uncritical way. The question is thus 
not ‘How should we react to traumatic histories?,’ but ‘What does it 
imply to assume a traumatic structure of history?’. 
20 When introducing the essays included in the volume Trauma: explora-
tions in memory (1995), Caruth describes this approach to trauma in a 
 
 
way that shows the interconnection between these two attitudes: “If on 
the one hand they [the two attitudes] remind us of the inaccessibility of 
trauma, of its resistance to full theoretical analysis and understanding, 
they also open up a perspective on the ways in which trauma can make 
possible survival, and on the means of engaging this possibility through 
the different modes of therapeutic, literary, and pedagogical encounter” 
(1995, 10). 
21 This is what is most compelling about the poetic evocation of the 
abyss, the fact that is only possible through the imagination, and not as a 
consequence of factual statements. 
22 This is perhaps LaCapra’s answer to the challenges that trauma theory 
poses to memory and history, what he calls a new notion of working-
through: “neither the simple binary opposite of acting-out or the repeti-
tion compulsion nor a total transcendence or disavowal of the traumas 
and losses of the past that continue to haunt or even possess the present 
[…] In working-through one does not totally transcend but rather attempt 
to generate counterforces to melancholia and compulsive repetition, both 
through psychic "work" on the self and through engagement in social and 
political practice with others […]” (2009, 84)  
23 It is important to clarify here that I have developed an interpretation of 
the figure of the abyss (in PR) from the point of view of Glissant’s under-
standing of the Slave Trade in DA; this is, of course, a Caribbean abyss. 
But if we look at PR as a separate work, I would say that part of Glis-
sant’s aim is to suggest that there is indeed an abyss at the core of all hi-
story, and the fact that this abyss is more graspable from the present-day 
Caribbean leads him to defend the idea that this region, and Antillanity 
[Antillanité], is a privilege place (or thought) in order to understand a 
Relation that infuses the whole world. The specificity of this answer, as 
different from the one in DA, must be developed in another text.  
24 “Consequently, this is not a minor aspect of our counterpoetics, our 
lived history, to which we are introduced by our struggle without witnes-
ses, the inability to create even an unconscious dating, a result of the era-
sing of memory in all of us. For history is not only absence for us, it is 
vertigo. This time what has never been ours, we must now possess” (DA 
473f/161; translation modified).  
25 Such is the suggestion by Acosta López, following Caruth, Nelly Ri-
chard, and Shoshana Felman (among others), when faced with the que-
stion of the relationship between trauma and a new form of language. As 
it is clear in her recent work on this question (See for example her contri-
bution to this issue and 2018), the focus is on instances of historical trau-
ma that run the risk of being forgotten altogether because we lack the 
frameworks to listen to the voice that cries out of the wound. As Acosta 
López put it in an oral presentation of her work in Universidad de los 
Andes (2017), what is at stake is to listen to the silence of that which will 
perhaps never be said but should not remain unheard.  
26 I want to make clear, however, that this question becomes fundamental 
in a context of slavery and colonialism, a context that I am linking to 
trauma theory and that is not immediately present in Caruth’s or Acosta 
López’s analyses. Thus, I am in no way suggesting that these authors 
would defend the necessity of just bearing witness to colonialism, ac-
companying it, or narrating it. What I am defending is that if we want to 
link trauma and colonialism (as Glissant himself wants to do), we need to 
acknowledge that the question becomes a different one: not how to narra-
te trauma, but how to overcome it; how to de-traumatize colonized com-
munities.  
27 In this sense, it could be said that in the Caribbean there was always a 
language of resistance that was not immediately the language of the colo-
nizer, even though, as I have tried to show following Glissant, it does not 
offer the complete conditions for decolonization. Not every element of 
the forms of expression is imposed externally by the colonizer; there is 
neither an absolute disconnection between reality and the words used to 
express it, nor a ““a state of hallucinated lucidity,” where every image is 
like the image coming out of the dream of someone else”, as Acosta Ló-
pez puts it in her contribution to this special issue following a well-known 
image of One Hundred Years of Solitude, by Gabriel García Márquez. 
The problem is not only that the colonized lack the means to “voice” or to 
“hear” their own reality, but also a matter of not having the right tools to 
create a new one. 
28 Glissant’s analyses of the Creole folktale, for example, show the self-
contradictory character of a forced poetics that is ultimately incapable of 
putting into question the validity of the oppressive system itself; the cha-
racter representing the slave-owner, or the exploiter, is always ridiculed 
by the trickster, even fooled, but the system itself is never challenged in 
these stories. (See DA 414/130) 
29 That is, it does not amount just to any form of expression. The poetic 
that is demanded to deal with the paradox of history should not focus 
only on the “scream” or the “cry” [cri] that signals the inconformity with 
the current set of conditions; “it is a question of transforming a scream 
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(which we once uttered) into a speech that grows from it, thus discove-
ring the expression, perhaps in an intellectual way, of a finally liberated 
poetics” (DA 418/133). 
30 Glissant describes the labor of the writer who is approaching this new 
temporality as a “prophetic vision of the past” in different texts (See DA 
226f/64; MT 15/7). A careful description of how this constitutes indeed a 
different temporality would have to be carried out elsewhere.  
